Ordinarily, the process of decision making by a committee through voting is modelled by a monotonic game the range of whose characteristic function is restricted to f0; 1g: The decision rule that governs the collective action of a voting body induces a hierarchy in the set of players in terms of the a-priori in ‡uence that the players have over the decision making process. In order to determine this hierarchy in a swap robust game, one has to either evaluate a number-based power index (e.g., the Shapley-Shubik index, the Banzhaf-Coleman index) for each player or conduct a pairwise comparison between players in order to …nd out whether there exists a coalition in which player i is desirable over another player j as a coalition partner. In this paper we outline a much simpler and more elegant mechanism to determine the ranking of players in terms of their a-priori power using only minimal winning coalitions, rather than the entire set of winning coalitions.
Introduction
The issue of voting power and its measurement concerns any collective decision making body which has to decide whether to accept or reject a bill by the process of voting. Typically, when a bill is presented before a voting body, the members either vote in favor of the bill or against it. Sometimes a voter has the option to abstain. However, as is common in most of the literature in this area, we ignore abstention so that the voters have only two choices -to either vote \yes" or \no". The class of mathematical structures that is used to model such situations is a simple voting game (SV G) or simply, a simple game which is de…ned by a …nite set of players or voters and a monotonic family of winning coalitions. Examples of such decision making bodies include the United Nations Security Council, the Council of Ministers in the European Union, the Lok Sabha of the Republic of India, the board room of any corporate house etc. The voting procedure in each of these collectivities is governed by its own constitution, which lays down the decision making rule of the collectivity. This decision making rule aggregates individual votes to arrive at the collective decision of the voting body as a whole. There can be many kinds of decision rules, e.g., simple majority decision rule, some quali…ed majority rule, unanimity rule etc to name a few. In fact a decision making voting body can have any decision rule provided it satis…es the following intuitively appealing conditions:
1. If all players vote in favor of a bill, it should be passed.
2. If all players vote against a bill, it should be rejected.
Increased support for a bill cannot hurt its prospects.
A decision rule is often characterized in terms of how it distributes power among the individual players or voters. In this framework, by the voting power of an individual player under a given decision rule, we mean the extent of control that the player possesses over the decision making process due to the decision rule alone. In other words, it is the constitutional power of the voter (see Felsenthal and Machover (1998) ).
However, often there are situations where we are more concerned with the ranking or hierarchy of players in terms of their in ‡uence rather than the quanti…cation of the amount of a-priori in ‡uence that players have. Many number-based indices exist that give us a measure of the constitutional power that an individual voter possesses. The ones that are most mentioned in the literature are the Shapley-Shubik (SS) (Shapley and Shubik, 1954) and the Banzhaf-Coleman (BC) (Banzhaf 1965 , Coleman 1971 ) indices (for more on power indices see Felsenthal and Machover (1998) ). These indices associate a real number to each voter, thereby inducing a complete preordering in the set of voters. As an example, a voter i with a high value of the SS index ranks higher in the SS preordering than another voter j for whom the value of the SS index is lower. Thus, according to the SS preordering, voter i has more a-priori power or control over the collective action of the voting body than the voter j: Sometimes these indices may end up ranking the voters di¤erently (see Saari and Sieberg (2001) ). But if we restrict our attention to weighted voting games 1 (see Tomiyama (1987)) or better still swap robust (linear) voting games, which form a larger class of voting games than weighted voting games (see Di¤o Lambo and Moulen (2002)), SS and BC preorderings coincide 2 . Thus, given a simple swap robust game, one way of …nding out the hierarchy induced in the set of players by the decision rule is by evaluating any one of the above mentioned indices for each player. This means we would have to calculate the number of winning coalitions in which a player is decisive, for all the players. The other method by which we can determine the ranking of players is by using the desirability (or in ‡uence) relation introduced by Isbell (1958) (also see Isbell (1956) , Taylor (1995) ). The desirability relation ranks voters with respect to how in ‡uential they are in the voting process, without assigning numbers to them. A voter whose vote is never pivotal or critical in any situation, i.e., who can never change the outcome of the voting process by changing the way he/she votes may be regarded as one who does not have any in ‡uence over the decision making process. A voter whose \yes" vote is necessary for the passage of the bill is a very in ‡uential voter. However, in most cases, a voter is critical in some situations, while in others he/she is not. That is, a typical voter can change the …nal outcome of the decision making process in some situations, while in other situations, the way he/she votes is irrelevant for the …nal outcome. It was established by Taylor (1995) that the desirability relation induces a complete preordering in the set of voters if and only if the simple game is swap robust. Furthermore, Di¤o Lambo and Moulen (2002) have shown that this preordering coincides with the SS and BC preorderings if the simple game is linear or swap robust. Thus, given a swap robust simple game, we could determine the ranking of players by conducting a pairwise comparison whereby a player i is ranked higher than player j if there is a coalition in which i is desirable over j as a coalition partner. This would take less time than having to evaluate one of the classical indices discussed above, since we could restrict our attention to the set of minimal winning coalitions rather than the entire set of 1 Weighted voting games are a class of SV Gs that can be represented by a system of non-negative weights and a quota. The vote of each player carries a non-negative weight. A bill is passed if and only if the sum of the weights (of the votes) of all players who vote in favor of the bill is at least as large as the prede…ned quota. Voting by disciplined party groups in multiparty parliaments can be modelled as weighted voting games. All weighted voting games are swap robust (Taylor and Zwicker (1993) winning coalitions. However, pairwise comparison may prove to be tedious, specially if the set of minimal winning coalitions is large.
The main result in this paper is as follows: a player i has more a-priori in ‡uence than player j if and only if the vector M (i); de…ned by the cardinalities of the minimal winning coalitions to which i belongs, dominates the vector M (j) in lexicographic ordering. Moreover, a player i has the same a-priori in ‡uence as player j if and only if the vector M (i) is equal to M (j). This elegant result can be used to determine the hierarchy (in terms of constitutional power) that is induced in the set of voters by the decision rule in a very straightforward manner. Since it involves only minimal winning coalitions, the method proves to be e¢ cient as well in the sense that it can determine the hierarchy in a much shorter time. In what follows we restict our attention to linear or swap robust simple voting games only.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the preliminaries. In section 3 we present the motivation behind the paper while we present our main result in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
De…nitions and preliminaries
Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng be a non-empty …nite set. We refer to the elements of N as players or voters. The collection of all subsets of N is denoted by P(N ). Any member of P(N ) is called a coalition. Given any family of sets F, we will use the notation jFj to denote the number of elements in the family.
The class of mathematical structures used to model voting situations is called simple voting games (SV G). Formally, De…nition 1 A simple voting game (SV G) G is a pair (N ; V ), where N is the set of voters, and V : P(N ) ! f0; 1g is the characteristic function satisfying the following conditions:
The above de…nition formalizes the idea of a decision making committee in which decisions are made by vote. The decision making rule is embodied in the characteristic function V . A coalition S 2 P(N ) is said to be a winning (losing) coalition if and only if V (S) = 1 (V (S) = 0). We denote the set of winning coalitions of the game G by W: [C1] says that if nobody votes in favor of the bill, the bill should be rejected. On the other hand, if everybody votes "yes", the bill should be passed ([C2]).
[C3] is a monotonicity requirement which says that more support for a bill cannot hurt the prospects of the bill. A coalition X 2 W is said to be a minimal winning coalition if no proper subset of it is winning, i.e., if for any Given a coalition X 2 W, a player i 2 X is said to be a critical defector in X if Xnfig = 2 W: It therefore follows that given a coalition X 2 W min , every player belonging to X is a critical defector, since it can render the coalition losing by leaving it. A player i 2 N is a dummy player if he/she does not belong to any minimal winning coalition. It is obvious that the way a dummy player votes is inconsequential to the …nal outcome of the voting process. Sometimes, in the context of constitutional power, dummy players may arise inadvertently. For example, the allocation of weights in the original six member Council of Ministers of the European Union made Luxembourg a dummy player under the voting rule during 1958-72 (see Felsenthal and Machover (2001)). On the other hand, a player i 2 N is called a veto player if he/she is a member of every minimal winning coalition. Thus, a veto player can prevent the adoption of a bill unilaterally (irrespective of how others vote) by voting \no". Examples of veto players abound in the real world. The …ve permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are veto players. Next we de…ne the desirability or the in ‡uence relation introduced by Isbell (1958) . D is called the strict desirability relation and D is the equi-desirability relation. We say that a player i is desirable over j as a coalition partner for X N nfi;
Remark 1 It easily follows from the above de…nition that given an SV G and two voters i; j 2 N; if i D j; then there must exist a coalition X N nfi; jg such that 
The concept of swap robustness was introduced by Taylor and Zwicker (1993) . An SV G is swap robust if one could swap two members in two winning coalitions and get at least one winning coalition as a result. Swap robust games, also known in the literature as complete or linear voting games, is a big class of SV Gs for which the in ‡uence relation de…ned above induces a complete preordering in the set of voters (see Taylor (1995) ). For more on swap robust games, also see Taylor C (i) = fX 2 W : i 2 X and Xnfig = 2 Wg That is, C (i) is the set of all winning coalitions in which voter i 2 N is a critical defector.
The Banzhaf-Coleman index BC for a voter i 2 N is given by
Therefore, evaluating BC for each player in the given simple game we get, BC a = ; BC e = 2 16 : Thus, we have the following hierarchy:
According to us, the main disadvantage of using the power indices in order to determine the ranking among players lies in the fact that not only do we need to …nd all winning coalitions but also determine the number of winning coalitions in which a voter is a critical defector 3 .
If on the other hand we use the desirability relation to reveal the hierarchy, we can restrict our attention to the set W min only. Since by replacing a by b in the coalition fa; c; dg, we fail to get a winning coalition, it means that there exists a situation in which a is more desirable as a coalition
Since, considering the set of minimal winning coalitions alone reduces a lot of work, we also restrict our attention to the set W min : However, the question arises whether we can use the information provided by W min more e¢ ciently in order to reveal the hierarchy of the players in a shorter time. In this paper we present a mechanism to determine the hierarchy that is decidedly simpler than the existing methods and is devoid of any algebraic computations. Let us de…ne another set: Furthermore, the following two statements are also equivalent:
For every integer m; 1 m n; jC (i; m)j jC (j; m)j and there is at least one value of m for which jC (i; m)j > jC (j; m)j :
If the above theorem keeps itself when we restrict our attention to the set of minimal winning coalitions, we might have an easier way of determining the hierarchy of players from the set W min . De…ne the following sets:
where m is an integer 1 m n:
That is, C min (i) is the set of all minimal winning coalitions to which voter i 2 N belongs.
By the de…nition of a minimal winning coalition, i is a critical defector in each of the coalitions in C min (i) : Similarly, C min (i; m) is the set of all minimal winning coalitions of size m of which voter i is a member. Given a swap robust game, if we can show that i D j is equivalent to saying that for every integer m; 1 m n; C min (i; m) C min (j; m) , we will have achieved our objective. However, it is not so. We …nd that for a swap robust SV G, and two voters i and j, i D j does not imply that for every integer m; 1 m n; C min (i; m) C min (j; m) : Furthermore, we know that if i D j then we must have 
The desirability relation and minimal winning coalitions
Given an SV G, consider the set W min of all minimal winning coalitions. Let us partition the set as follows
where W min (k t ) = fX 2 W min : jXj = k t g. T denotes the number of di¤erent sizes of minimal winning coalitions and is a positive integer 1. k t is an integer such that n k t 1, for all t 2 f1; :::; T g: We also have k 1 < k 2 < ::: < k T : Thus, k 1 denotes the size of the smallest minimal winning coalition and k T is the size of the largest minimal winning coalition. In the example discussed in the previous section, T = 3; k 1 = 2; k 2 = 3 and k 3 = 4:
For every i 2 N; let us consider the following vector that is de…ned by the cardinalities of the minimal winning coalitions to which it belongs: 
Next we present a proposition which is crucial in proving Theorem 4.2 below.
Proposition 4.1 Consider a swap robust SV G and any two players i; j 2 N:
T be the associated vectors. Let h (1 h T ) be the maximum value of t such that c t (i) = c t (j) 8t 2 f1; 2; :::; hg: Then 8X 2 C min (i; k t ), such that j = 2 X and 8t 2 f1; 2; :::; hg; we have Xnfig [ fjg 2 C min (j; k t ) : Also 8Y 2 C min (j; k t ), such that i = 2 Y and 8t 2 f1; 2; :::; hg; we have
Proof. We will prove this by induction on t. Since the SV G is swap robust, let us assume without loss of generality that i D j:
Step 1: Take a coalition Y 1 2 C min (j; k 1 ), where k 1 is the size of the smallest minimal winning coalition: We can assume that c 1 (j) 6 = 0: Now, i may or may not belong to 
However it is obvious that jY
This contradicts the fact that k 1 is the size of the smallest minimal winning coalition. Therefore, we can construct an injective mapping
where
This together with the fact that c 1 (i) = c 1 (j) implies that the mapping is bijective, that is,
Step 2: Now consider the family
Since by assumption i D j; we must have 
But we have already shown in step 1 that 8X 2 C min (i; k 1 ) ;
which in turn contradicts that Y 2 2 W min : Therefore, we can again construct an injective mapping
This together with the fact that c 2 (i) = c 2 (j) gives us that 8X 2 C min (i; k 2 ) ; such that
Step 3: Consider the family C min (j;
then we must have 
However it implies that jY
But we have already shown in steps 1 and 2 above that 8X 2 C min (i; k t ) ; such that j = 2 X we have Xnfig [ fjg 2 C min (j; k t ) ;
This contradicts that Y 3 2 W min : Therefore, we can again construct an injective mapping
This combined with the fact that c
Step 4: Let us now assume that the result holds for all values of t = 1; 2; :::; h 1: We will now prove that the result holds for t = h too. Consider a coalition 
min (i; k t ) for some 1 t < h, (say) t 0 : But since we have assumed at the beginning of step 4 that the result holds
we can again construct an injective mapping
for t = h too, where
Since we also have c h (i) = c h (j) ; it must be true that 8X 2 C min (i; k h ) ; such that
Hence the proof of the proposition.
Remark 2 Note that there may be some values of t, 1 t h; such that c t (i) = c t (j) = 0: This simply means that the players i and j do not belong to any minimal winning coalition of size t: We intentionally ignore such values of t. It is easy to see that the inclusion of these cases does not change the result of the proposition.
We will now use the result of the above proposition to show that in a linear voting game, two voters i and j are equally in ‡uential if and only if the associated vectors M (i) and M (j) are equal to each other. Furthermore, i is strictly more in ‡uential than j if and only if M (i) dominates M (j) in lexicographic ordering. We ignore the case of dummies from the analysis since by de…nition a dummy player has no in ‡uence over the decision making process. 
Furthermore, the following two statements are also equivalent:
Proof. It is easy to verify that (a) ) (b).
(b) ) (a) : By the virtue of Proposition 4.1 we know that if h is the maximum value of t such that c t (i) = c t (j) 8t 2 f1; 2; :::hg; then for all coalitions X N nfi; jg; (d) ) (c) : Contrary to the claim let us assume that j D i (since we cannot have i D j). Let h be that value of t such that c h (i) > c h (j) and c t (i) = c t (j) ; 1 t < h: Using the same reasoning as above we know that there must exist at least one coalition 
Conclusion
In this paper, we present an e¢ cient method of determining the hierarchy of players who participate in a decision making process, in terms of their a-priori in ‡uence over the collective action of the voting body. This method is notably simpler than the other existing mechanisms. We show that given a swap robust voting game, a player i is more desirable or in ‡uential than another player j if the vector M (i); that is de…ned by the cardinalities of the minimal winnig coalitions to which i belongs, lexicographically dominates the vector M (j): Using this result one can very easily establish the ranking of the players without any complicated algebraic computations.
